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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
I. INCARCERATION DOES NOT PRECLUDE CLAIMANT FROM
RECEIVING WORKERS' COMPENSATION AWARD
In Last v. MSI Construction Co.' the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a claimant's imprisonment does not preclude him from
receiving workers' compensation benefits that arose before the incarcera-
tion.' The Last court adopted the approach of the majority of courts that
have addressed this issue.3
Last was injured in an on-the-job accident on October 8, 1987.
Last's employer, MSI Construction Company ("MSI"), provided him
temporary total benefits and medical treatment under the company's
workers' compensation insurance. In December 1987, Last was
incarcerated for a crime unrelated to his accident. Because of his
imprisonment, Last missed a scheduled medical treatment. After MSI's
workers' compensation insurance carrier discovered that Last was in
prison, the carrier stopped payment of benefits on Last's claim. The
carrier subsequently filed a stop-payment application with the Workers'
Compensation Commission ("Commission"), but the Commissioner ruled
that Last was entitled to benefits.4 On appeal, the full Commission
allowed the termination of benefits because the Commission found that
Last's inability to work was caused by his incarceration, not the work-
related injury.' The circuit court reversed the full Commission and
reinstated the ruling of the single Commissioner.6 Both the carrier and
MSI then appealed to the supreme court.
On appeal, the appellants first argued that Last was not entitled to
receive temporary total benefits because the incarceration, not the work-
related injury, impaired his ability to earn wages.7 However, the court
rejected this argument and declared "the fact that a claimant is unemploy-
,able for reasons other than his injury is not dispositive. The issue is
1. 305 S.C. 349, 409 S.E.2d 334 (1991).
2. Id. at 351, 409 S.E.2d at 336.
3. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority
and minority approaches.
4. Last, 305 S.C. at 350, 409 S.E.2d at 335.
5. Id. at 351, 409 S.E.2d at 336.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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whether a claimant has suffered some loss of earning capacity as a direct
result of his work-related injury.'
Secondly, the appellants argued that under South Carolina law the
claimant was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because no
statutory provision specifically grants prisoners the right to receive such
benefits.9 However, the court noted that the entitlement to workers'
compensation benefits constitutes a property interest" and that the South
Carolina Constitution prohibits the automatic forfeiture of property rights
upon conviction." Accordingly, the court refused to construe section
42-1-470 to "unconstitutionally deprive an inmate of a property interest
without due process of law."12
The appellants also argued that termination of Last's benefits was
justified because substantial evidence showed that the claimant had
refused medical care. 3 An employee's refusal to accept medical
treatments bars recovery of compensation during the period of refusal. 4
However, the court found no evidence in the record that Last had refused
medical treatment after the Commissioner designated a physician for the
claimant.' 5
Finally, the appellants contended that the carrier was entitled to stop
payment of benefits because the claimant had refused employment. The
court noted that section 42-9-190 of the South Carolina Code "bars an
employee from compensation if he refuses employment procured for him
that is suitable to his capacity and approved by the Commission."' 6
Moreover, under Workers' Compensation Commission Regulation 67-
8. Id. (citing Hines v. Hendricks Canning Co., 263 S.C. 399, 211 S.E.2d 220
(1975) (allowing employee's temporary total benefits because the claimant's work-
related injury, not his full-time school attendance, caused his loss of earning
capacity)); cf. Tallini v. Martino & Son, 448 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that
a claimant who is voluntarily committed to a mental institution is entitled to continued
compensation for his work-related permanent partial disability).
9. Last, 305 S.C. at 352, 409 S.E.2d at 336.
10. Id. (citing Orszula v. Orszula, 292 S.C. 264, 356 S.E.2d 114 (1987)).
11. Id. (citing Weeks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223, 122 S.E. 586
(1924) (applying S.C. CONST. art. I, § 4)).
12. Id. Section 42-1-470 of the South Carolina Code provides: "Except as
otherwise specifically provided in this article, this Title shall not apply to State,
county or municipal prisoners and convicts." S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-470 (Law. Co-
op. 1976).
13. Last, 305 S.C. at 352, 409 S.E.2d at 336-37.
14. Id. at 352, 409 S.E.2d at 337 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-60 (Law. Co-
op. 1976)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 353, 409 S.E.2d at 337 (applying S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-190 (Law.
Co-op. 1976)).
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506, "an employer may file a stop payment application if an employee
refuses a suitable job after his health care provider reports he has
reached maximum improvement." 7 The court concluded that, because
the record did not indicate that Last had reached maximum medical
healing, the Commission erred in finding Last had refused employ-
ment. 
8
The majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have held
that incarceration does not terminate workers' compensation benefits. 9
For example, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that a claimant's
incarceration does not terminate his workers' compensation benefits
because these benefits are a property right.2' The Arizona court noted
that there is no legislation that specifically provides for suspension or
termination of benefits during the claimant's imprisonment.2'
On the other hand, a minority of jurisdictions have held that
workers' compensation benefits are terminated or suspended upon
imprisonment.' The Supreme Court of Georgia specifically held that
when "an employee is charged with a crime while receiving [workers'
compensation] benefits, . . . the proper time of termination of benefits
is the date of adjudication of guilt. "'
17. Id. (citing S.C. CODE REGS. 67-506 (1990)).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., United Riggers Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 640 P.2d 189
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Foraker v. NVF Co., 358 A.2d 730 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976);
Forshee & Langley Logging v. Peckham, 788 P.2d 487 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Spera
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp. Div. (In re Injury to Spera), 713 P.2d
1155 (Wyo. 1986); cf. Baskerville v. Saunders Oil Co., 336 S.E.2d 512 (Va. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding that incarceration does not terminate benefits when the loss of
earning power is caused by temporary or permanent total disability, but that
incarceration does terminate benefits for temporary partial disability). See generally
Noralyn 0. Harlow, Annotation, Workers' Compensation: Incarceration as
Terminating Benefits, 54 A.L.R.4TH 241, 245 (1987).
20. United Riggers, 640 P.2d at 192-93.
21. Id. at 193. A number of states have enacted legislation in this area. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Industrial Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 1987) (per
curium). The South Carolina Workers' CompensationAct, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-
10 to 42-19-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991), does not address this issue.
However, the Last court left open the possibility of a future statutory measure
providing for the suspension or termination of benefits upon incarceration.
22. See, e.g., Packard v. Donald Sperry & Sons, 331 N.Y.S.2d 126 (App. Div.
1972) (mem.); State ex rel. Grennan v. Barry, 594 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(citing State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Industrial Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 1987) (per
curiam)). See generally Harlow, supra note 19, at 245.
23. Scott Hous. Sys., Inc. v. Howard, 353 S.E.2d 2, 3 (Ga. 1987); see also
Mize v. Cleveland Express, 392 S.E.2d 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
1992]
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The South Carolina Supreme Court in Last appears to agree with the
majority view that allows for the continuation of benefits upon imprison-
ment. The court, however, left open the possibility of terminating
benefits during the claimant's imprisonment if the claimant has reached
maximum medical healing. 4
Julie A. Oswald
II. EMPLOYEE'S ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS NOT BARRED BY WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT
In McSwain v. SheP2 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act26 did not
bar an employee's common-law action against her employer for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.27 The court extended the rule
established in Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co.2" that the Workers'
Compensation Act does not bar an employee's common-law action
against an employer for assault and battery.29 However, the McSwain
court cautioned that it expressed no opinion concerning the application
of the exclusivity provision to other intentional torts.
30
McSwain sued her employer, Shei, for intention infliction of
emotional distress. McSwain alleged that Shei forced her to perform
group exercises that caused her to lose bladder control even though Shei
knew that McSwain's physician had advised against the exercises. 31 Shei
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the circuit court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction because the Workers' Compensation Act
provided the exclusive remedy for McSwain's claim. The circuit court
denied Shei's motion, and Shei appealed.
3 2
24. See Last v. MSI Constr. Co., 305 S.C. 349, 353, 409 S.E.2d 334, 337
(1991).
25. 304 S.C. 25, 402 S.E.2d 890 (1991).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (providing that an
employee's rights and remedies under the Act preclude all common-law rights and
remedies against employer).
27. McSwain, 304 S.C. at 30, 402 S.E.2d at 893.
28. 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940).
29. McSwain, 304 S.C. at 29-30, 402 S.E.2d at 892 (citing Stewart, 194 S.C. 50,
9 S.E.2d 35).
30. Id. at 30, 402 S.E.2d at 892.
31. Id. at 27, 402 S.E.2d at 890-91.
32. Id. at 27, 402 S.E.2d at 891.
[Vol. 44
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Upholding the lower court's denial of summary judgment, the
supreme court relied heavily on its decision in Stewart v. McLellan's
Stores Co., which created an exception to the exclusivity of the
Workers' Compensation Act.34 The McSwain court initially noted that
an employee's common-law action against an employer is barred if the
employee suffers an "'injury by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment.'"" In Stewart the court excepted from this general rule
an employee's injury resulting from an employer's intentional act that
resulted in no physical disability.36 In McSwain the court rejected Shei's
argument that Stewart is limited to actions involving assault and battery
when the employer suffers no physical disability. The court reasoned that
this exception is based upon the nature of the act that caused the
employee's injury, i.e. whether the act was intentional or accidental.37
The court noted that the workers' compensation laws govern only
injuries "caused by an 'accident'" and that an "'employer will not be
heard to allege that the injury was "accidental" . . . when he himself
intentionally committed the act.'"" The McSwain court expressly
extended Stewart to include intentional infliction of emotional distress,
but did not express an opinion about the rule's application to other
intentional torts.39 The court held that, because McSwain alleged facts
sufficient to prove the common-law elements of intentional infliction of
emotional distress,40 a question of fact existed for the jury; therefore,
the lower court properly denied Shei's motion for summary judgment.4"
The court stressed, however, that an employee may not recover both at
common law and under the Workers' Compensation Act.42
33. 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940).
34. Id. at 55-56, 9 S.E.2d at 37.
35. McSwain, 304 S.C. at 28, 402 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-
1-160 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
36. Stewart, 194 S.C. at 55-56, 9 S.E.2d at 37. In Stewart the employee who
was slapped in the face was "greatly humiliated,... and embarrassed," but otherwise
suffered no physical disability compensable under the workers' compensation scheme.
Id. at 52-53, 9 S.E.2d at 35-36.
37. McSwain, 304 S.C. at 29, 402 S.E.2d at 892.
38. Id. (quoting 2A ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 68.11 (1989)).
39. Id. at 29-30, 402 S.E.2d at 892.
40. See Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981) (enumerating the
four common-law elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress in South
Carolina), cited in McSwain, 304 S.C. at 28, 402 S.E.2d at 891.
41. McSwain, 304 S.C. at 30, 402 S.E.2d at 892-93.
42. Id. at 30-31, 402 S.E.2d at 893.
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In extending the Stewart rule, the supreme court followed the
generally accepted principle that the intentional acts of an employer
acting in person rather than through an agent will support an action at
common law.43 However, the common-law liability of the employer does
not include the intentional acts of an employee who merely supervises the
claimant." In McSwain the president and managing officer of the
company performed the alleged intentional acts. This situation is clearly
within the bounds of the general principle. However, the situation in
Stewart, the case upon which the McSwain court relies, is not as clear.
In Stewart, the manager of the defendant employee's store commit-
ted the assault and battery upon the employee.45 Although the Stewart
court justified its decision by stating that the manager was an "alter ego"
of the employer,4 6 the assailant's status as a store manager is more like
that of an agent.4' The Stewart opinion stretched the limit of the "alter
ego" analysis to its extreme probably because the employee would have
had no other recourse against the employer.4" Although the supreme
court's decision in McSwain is sound, the court should have explained
the Stewart court's apparent misapplication of the facts. Nevertheless, the
McSwain court's extension of Stewart is difficult to reconcile with the
general view that an employer is not vicariously liable at common law
for the intentional acts of its agents and employees.
43. See generally 2A ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION § 68.1,1 (1992).
44. Id. § 68.00. In South Carolina assault and battery by a supervisor against
another employee arising "out of and in the course of employment" is governed
exclusively by the workers' compensation laws. See, e.g., Thompson v. J.A. Jones
Constr. Co., 199 S.C. 304, 19 S.E.2d 226 (1942).
45. Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 51-52, 9 S.E.2d 35, 35
(1940).
46. Id. at 55-56, 9 S.E.2d at 37.
47. In fact, the very treatise that the McSwain court cited in support of its
decision criticizes the Stewart decision. In criticizing Stewart, Larson states that:
having worked itself up into a state of moral indignation against the
assailant, the court then - imperceptibly and without a word of justifica-
tion'- transfers this entire flood of indignation from the actual culprit to
the innocent employer, whose only connection with the intentional wrong
is the most artificial and fictitious kind of technical vicarious liability.
LARSON, supra note 43, § 68.21.
48. When Stewart was decided, an injured employee could recover from workers'
compensation only if there was a physical disability. See Stewart, 194 S.C. at 55, 9'
S.E.2d at 37. But see Stokes v. First Nat'l Bank, 298 S.C. 13, 377 S.E.2d 922 (Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that an employee can recover under the Workers' Compensation
Act for purely mental injury without accompanying physical injury), aff'd, 306 S.C.
46, 410 S.E.2d 248 (S.C. 1991).
[Vol. 44
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general view that an employer is not vicariously liable at common law
for the intentional acts of its agents and employees.
In Dickert v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.49 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that the intentional acts of a company sales
manager against a subordinate employee were governed exclusively by
the Workers' Compensation Act.5 The Dickert court distinguished both
McSwain and Stewart by noting that those cases involved the employer's
direct liability.51 Nevertheless, it is difficult to distinguish between the
store manager in Stewart and the sales manager in Dickert. Although the
employees in both cases were agents of their employers, the Stewart
court held that the Workers' Compensation Act did not control;
52
however, the Dickert court held that the Act did control. 3 The Dickert
court properly distinguished McSwain, but the court's attempt to
distinguish Stewart is not persuasive.
The McSwain decision raises another interesting issue. Clearly, if
McSwain prevails at common law, she would be barred from recovery
under the Workers' Compensation Act. 4 However, if McSwain is
unsuccessful in her action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
it is unclear whether she would then be able to bring a workers'
compensation action claiming that she was injured by an "accident."
South Carolina courts have not addressed this election of remedies
question;55 however, the majority rule is that an unsuccessful common-
law damages suit does not bar a subsequent workers' compensation
claim.56 The rationale of the majority rule is that an election between
a common-law remedy that ultimately fails and a possible statutory
remedy is not an election at all. In other words, the common-law remedy
that fails is nonexistent.
General case law in South Carolina concerning election of remedies
suggests that the South Carolina courts would follow the majority
49. 411 S.E.2d 672 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
50. Id. at 677.
51. Id. at 677-78.
52. Stewart, 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35.
53. Dickert, 411 S.E.2d 672.
54. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
55. However, courts have addressed the issue of an injured employee who brings
a common-law action against a third party rather than the employer. In these cases,
election of remedies issues are addressed by the Workers' Compensation Act and
common law. See, e.g., Hudson v. Townsend Saw Chain Co., 296 S.C. 17, 370
S.E.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1988); Fisher v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Retardation,
277 S.C. 573, 291 S.E.2d 200 (1982).
56. See generally LARSON, supra note 43, § 67.31.
57. Id.
1992]
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approach. In Save Charleston Foundation v. Murray5 8 the South
Carolina Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he doctrine of election of
remedies involves a choice between two or more different and coexisting
modes of procedure and relief afforded by law for the same injury." 9
The court noted that the doctrine was intended to prevent double
recovery by the plaintiff. When a plaintiff has a choice of remedies, "[a]
suit upon the remedy first invoked [which reaches] the stage of final
adjudication" bars a subsequent suit on another remedy.'
In contrast, an employee who is injured by an accident in the course
of employment has no choice of remedies because the Workers'
Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy. 6' When an employer
acts intentionally and in person, there is no "accident" for purposes of
workers' compensation, and the employee's only remedy for injury is at
common law.62 If McSwain's common-law claim fails, it would
probably be because of her mistaken belief that Shei's actions were
intentional. A mistaken pursuit of a nonexistent remedy should not bar
McSwain from seeking recovery before the Workers' Compensation
Commission.
In McSwain, the supreme court properly applied the generally
accepted principle that an employer acting in person should not be able
to use the Workers' Compensation Act to limit the employer's liability
for intentional torts. However, the McSwain court expressly refused to
extend this exception beyond assault and battery and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
Brian W. Bennett
58. 286 S.C. 170, 333 S.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1985).
59. Id. at 175, 333 S.E.2d at 63 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 176, 333 S.E.2d at 64 (citations omitted). For example, when a
plaintiff recovers under a claim submitted to arbitration and the claim is fully
adjudicated in that forum, the plaintiff is barred from seeking recovery on the same
claim under a different theory in a different forum. Id.
61. See Dickert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 411 S.E.2d 672 (S.C. Ct. App.
1991).
62. McSwain v. Shei, 304 S.C. 25, 402 S.E.2d 890 (1991).
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